Europe, Greece and the United Kingdom: Navigating the Era of Polycrises and Strategic Autonomy
“Distinguished participants,
Dear friends,
First, I would like to thank the British Embassy in Athens, the Greek Embassy in London, and the Delphi Economic Forum for giving me the oportunity to deliver this year’s Symposium Speech.
The Greek-British Symposium has already made an important contribution to strengthening the ties between our two countries and advancing our mutual benefit.
Greek–British relations rest on strong foundations built over many years. First and foremost, the sea forms a permanent maritime highway linking the destinies of Greece and the United Kingdom. We are two nations that have always looked to the sea and to the qualities it instils in every people: a love of freedom, progress and enterprise. And while we Greeks can take pride in having invented direct democracy only a few kilometres from where we stand today, it was Britain that made a decisive contribution to the creation and development of modern parliamentarism as we know it today.
I would like to focus on just two of the many defining moments in Greek–British relations. First, British diplomatic involvement played a decisive role in transforming the Greek struggle for independence from a revolutionary movement into an internationally recognised cause and, ultimately, an independent state. Clearly, we Greeks created the revolutionary reality and managed to keep it alive through those difficult early years. Yet Britain’s shift from initial caution to active involvement proved catalytic: it brought financial resources, international political support and philhellenic networks, and, above all, set in motion a rivalry among the Great Powers of the time that culminated in an internationally imposed settlement of the Greek question and, ultimately, the creation of an independent Greek state.
Second, the shared wartime experience of Greeks, Britons and Commonwealth soldiers in the fight against Nazism and fascism forms an important chapter in twentieth-century Greek–British relations.
Today, Europe stands at a historic turning point. Geography, long thought to have receded in importance in the face of technology and globalisation, is re-emerging as a decisive determinant of power. Maritime passages, energy routes and critical raw materials are once again directly shaping the economy, security and citizens’ daily lives. The turbulence in the Strait of Hormuz shows how fragile supply chains remain and how quickly a regional crisis can become a global problem.
At the same time, the pendulum of history appears to be swinging away from the West. Deindustrialisation, inequality, strategic overextension, a lack of leadership and the West’s dismissive attitude towards other political and social models are converging with the rise of Asia. Europe and the United States account for a diminishing share of global GDP, while China has significantly strengthened its economic and geopolitical position. In this new environment, the climate crisis, disinformation, social polarisation, cyberattacks, geopolitical rivalries and the uncontrolled development of artificial intelligence are creating a landscape of persistent uncertainty.
The question, therefore, is not whether Europe must change course, but how it can do so without undermining the very core of European integration: democracy, rights, stability, respect for international rules and leadership on global challenges such as climate change. Following Russia’s war in Ukraine, the pandemic and the gradual withdrawal of the United States from its role as the ultimate guarantor of European security, strategic autonomy can no longer be treated as a theoretical debate. It is a condition for survival.
In today’s difficult international environment, Brexit has weakened both the European Union and the United Kingdom. The EU lost not only a major economic partner but also a country with substantial historical influence, a strong democratic tradition, significant military capabilities, and extensive international relationships. The United Kingdom, in turn, lost access to the full benefits of the EU’s large single market and, above all, the ability to help shape the Union’s decisions at a particularly critical time.
With full respect for the decision made by the citizens of the United Kingdom, I would like to set out my view of the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union. This distinction matters: the United Kingdom may have left the EU, but it remains an integral part of Europe politically, culturally, and economically. It is therefore more accurate to speak of relations between the United Kingdom and the EU than of relations between the United Kingdom and Europe.
The scale of our shared challenges makes a stronger relationship increasingly necessary. These challenges include protecting democratic institutions, strengthening the economy and international trade, improving defence and security, securing energy supplies, and addressing climate change. In my view, the best outcome would be the United Kingdom’s return to the EU’s institutional framework. If that is not feasible, the United Kingdom should nevertheless have a closer relationship with the EU than any of the Union’s other partners.
A closer relationship would require both sides to resolve a range of practical issues. Energy should be among the first areas considered. In terms of security of supply, there is no controversy that increased interconnectivity is a shared interest of the EU and the UK. But when it comes to a new electricity trading agreement, things get more complicated. Both sides need to make concessions. And the fact that electricity trading is already possible under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement should not make us lazy. A new electricity agreement can help both sides to cut the cost of trading electricity, strengthen our energy security, drive investments and help to achieve our climate goals.
Energy lies at the heart of our common challenges. While global consumption is increasing and hydrocarbons still account for 80% of global total demand, both the EU and the UK remain dependent on imported fossil fuels. According to the latest data, in 2025 UK’s fossil fuel dependency was 75.1% . In 2023, EU’s gas and oil dependency was 90% and 95% respectively.
This overwhelming dependence creates a costly vulnerability. In 2025 alone, the EU spent about €340 billion on these imports. Since the start of the war, the EU has already paid more than 100 billion euro extra for fossil fuel imports without a single extra molecule of energy received.
Changing suppliers is necessary, but insufficient, because it ultimately shifts our vulnerability from one geopolitical relationship to another. Unfortunately, the increased deployment of renewable energy sources has not delivered the necessary reduction in energy prices, heightening the pressures on social cohesion, particularly for vulnerable households, and on competitiveness, especially for energy-intensive businesses.
The recent tensions in the Middle East and Russia’s war against Ukraine demonstrate how quickly geopolitical crises can disrupt energy flows and lead to price increases.
Unfortunately, both the EU and UK have limited influence over any eventual peace agreement in Iran. Even so, we must prepare for a more difficult reality: the effects of the conflict could continue to shape the region and our economies for months, or even years.
A lasting end to the war and the full restoration of free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, without tolls, remain essential goals.
Mounting disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz are draining global oil inventories at a record pace.
Benchmark oil prices have swung sharply as markets react to conflicting signals over whether the United States and Iran may soon reach an agreement to end permanently the conflict.
And even if a supply shortage is not visible yet, there are already concerns about oil products like diesel and jet fuels.
The EU has sought to respond to this challenge through a set of measures included in the 2022 REPowerEU Strategy and last Aprils “Accelerate EU” Communication.
In my view, three priorities stand out for the EU and for the UK:
- energy saving and energy efficiency, to reduce demand
- diversification of supply sources, to avoid excessive dependence on individual suppliers or transit routes, and
- accelerated development of renewable and other indigenous energy sources to reduce external dependence.
Looking back on my time as Greece’s Minister for Energy from 2010 to 2014, these were precisely the strategic objectives we pursued. In brief, our energy policy focused on the following priorities:
- We advanced energy efficiency policies to such an extent that, by 2015-2016, the European Commission ranked the “Save at Home” programme, as the second best in the EU, after Spain’s.
- We accelerated the development of renewable energy sources, helping Greece rank third globally in per capita photovoltaic production and seventh in Europe in wind power.
- We secured major energy interconnections as EU priority projects and Greek strategic investments, including TAP, IGB, East Med, the Alexandroupolis FSRU, the Revythousa LNG upgrade, the second electricity interconnection with Bulgaria, and the Great Sea Interconnector between Crete and Cyprus.
Most of these projects are already operating, except the two linked to Cyprus. I hope Greece and Cyprus will move ahead with the electricity interconnection and keep East Med alive, at least as a future hydrogen interconnector.
We also took an additional step: we promoted hydrocarbon exploration. We did so because we understood that expanding renewables also requires natural gas as a transition fuel to provide flexibility and security of supply. We also foresaw that, especially after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the EU would need to reduce its dependence on its dominant supplier. Yet because of delays, Greece’s energy dependence on third-country suppliers remains around 75%, compared with 58% for the EU-27 and 43% for the UK.
I hope the Greek Government will do whatever it takes to advance our national hydrocarbons programme by resolving the problems that drove investors such as Repsol, Total, and, more recently, the Helleniq Petroleum–ExxonMobil consortium away from Greece.
The past four years Europe, including UK of course, has shown significant achievements in the energy sector. But at the same time, new challenges arise.
Since Russia’s war in Ukraine, the EU has cut its dependence on Russian fossil fuels from about 40% in 2021 to about 6% today. But diversification still requires new pipelines, LNG terminals, and solutions to unresolved regulatory issues. This remains the key open issue for the Vertical Corridor, which Europe and the US are working on. I hope all parties will soon finalize the necessary arrangements for a project first agreed in 2014, when I signed with my counterparts the Ministers of Bulgaria and Romania the opening agreement.
The EU’s decision to ban all Russian gas imports by the end of 2027 puts LNG at the centre of its energy policy. In 2025, the EU imported a record 146 billion cubic meters, confirming LNG’s crucial role and making the EU the world’s largest LNG importer. The United States supplied 58% of those imports.
All this shows that both sides need flexible long-term LNG contracts. Europe needs them to reduce exposure to volatile global spot markets as Russian pipeline gas ends, while the US needs them to secure its medium- and long-term market share in Europe.
The EU already has a tool to pool gas demand from EU and Energy Community companies and match it with competitive supply: AggregateEU, launched in April 2023 in response to the gas crisis caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Although AggregateEU was launched only in 2023, I am proud of it, because it reflected one of the five proposals I submitted to the European Commission in 2014, when Greece held the EU Presidency and I chaired the Council of EU Energy Ministers.
Greece can play a crucial strategic role with its position in Southeast Europe, LNG terminals, gas pipelines, and commercial fleet, ensuring smooth LNG exports from the US to Europe and beyond. By mid-2025, Greek-owned LNG tankers controlled about 25% of global capacity, and that share is still rising as Greek shipping companies place major new shipyard orders.
We, the Greeks, cannot afford to lose the opportunity to develop in Greece the entire ecosystem needed for this energy supply chain, including energy infrastructure, maritime LNG transfer, shipyards, constructors and installers of pipes, cables, etc.
Alongside energy independence, the EU and the UK alike, are also pursuing the energy transition. In practice, competitiveness and reduced reliance on foreign suppliers may prove stronger drivers than climate action alone, especially since the EU accounts for only 6–7% of global greenhouse gas emissions.
Unfortunately, decarbonization alone will not guarantee low prices in the coming years. To make energy affordable, the EU needs major grid expansion, more storage, economy-wide electrification, electricity market reform, international cooperation and less reliance on natural gas at peak demand.
First, on renewables and storage. The Commission is right: to secure energy supply, we must accelerate renewables. But the EU has not advanced storage at the same pace. As a result, we waste part of the renewable energy we produce and miss the chance to lower prices. With more storage, we could use cheaper renewable power throughout the day instead of expensive imported gas. Greece is already paying the price: renewable curtailment rose from 3.5% in 2024 to about 7.5% in 2025 and could reach 12% in 2026—more than tripling in three years.
Second, on investment needs in networks. Europe needs more network investment for two reasons: to integrate renewables into the system and to remove bottlenecks in cross-border interconnections. Countries like Greece have been hit hard by congestion in the electricity networks of Southeast Europe and between Southeast and Central Europe, which is one reason prices remain higher in our region.
I hope the new TEN-E Regulation for Energy Infrastructure and the new Connecting Europe Facility Regulation, known as CEF Regulation, for which I am the responsible S&D Rapporteur, will help address this. CEF Regulation is Europe’s main instrument to achieve an up-to-date, high-performance and resilient infrastructure. CEF-Energy funds cross-boarder electricity interconnections and storage, as well as, CO2 and hydrogen infrastructure and its goal is to addresses market failures and to help leverage investment and funding from other sources, such as national budgets, national energy tariff systems and the private sector. The new EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (“MFF”) has allocated 30 billion Euros on CEF-Energy, an amount three time higher than the previous MFF, and it is able to mobilize up to additional 50 billion Euros from the private sector.
Third, on exploiting indigenous energy resources. Beyond hydrocarbons, the EU must do more to promote solar heat, geothermal energy, and critical raw materials. Greece is fortunate to have strong potential in all three.
Fourth, on our relations with our partners. We need to preserve market access to third countries on a reciprocity basis, secure our energy supplies and facilitate just energy transition in our partners. The EU has the means to achieve such goals, like the Energy Community in SE Europe, Eastern Partnership for eastern Europe and the Global Gateway. Recently, the European Union launched the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy and Clean-Tech Cooperation Initiative (T-MED) to accelerate clean energy partnerships and investment between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean neighbours. T-MED is designed to mobilise investments in clean energy projects, develop a clean tech ecosystem by supporting regional value chains, implement reforms, such as faster permitting and more transparent tariff systems, build skills and create jobs and modernise energy systems by upgrading grids, deploying smart-grid technologies, strengthening cybersecurity and improving cross-border interconnections. To achieve these objectives, T-MED seeks to mobilise 25 billions of euros in private investment by 2035.
Finally, Europe must produce, process, reuse, and recycle strategic and critical raw materials to support the green and digital transitions and strengthen defense. This requires investment de-risking, faster permitting, affordable and secure energy, and a new relationship with local communities to build acceptance for these projects.
This last argument is very crucial, because our strangle for resilience and strategic autonomy is not focussed only on energy and climate change. In this new era, decarbonisation, resilient supply chains, defence, space infrastructure and digital sovereignty are all dimensions of the same challenge. Without a strong manufacturing base—without steel, aluminium, chemicals, fertilisers and critical raw materials—Europe can achieve neither the economic growth needed to deliver a social dividend nor the green transition, defence capability and technological independence it requires. Strategic autonomy begins with production.
As rapporteur for the Socialists on the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), I had the honour of facilitating EU to establish two critical principles: European funding should generate investment and jobs in Europe, and products financed by Europe should not be subject to restrictions imposed by third countries. For Greece, this is an opportunity to connect defence spending with domestic industrial development and support for small and medium-sized enterprises.
The same logic applies to technological sovereignty. More than 80% of Europe’s digital services depend on foreign platforms, while a handful of US providers dominate the cloud market. Unless Europe invests in data, cloud computing, semiconductors, artificial intelligence and its own digital infrastructure, it risks becoming a digital colony. IRIS², GovSatCom, Galileo and Copernicus, alongside policies supporting semiconductors, open data and open source, can strengthen Europe’s operational and strategic autonomy. Knowledge is power for societies that do not wait for history to unfold, but shape it and lead. Regulation without investment does not create sovereignty; it merely governs weakness.
Looking ahead, EUs Institutions and national governments alike, should now present an ambitious, forward-looking plan for the next decade. This plan should position our societies as hubs for the production and transit of green energy, while making energy policy a central driver of a modern, competitive, resilient and socially just economy.
Europe itself must make a historic shift: from a continent in decline, which mainly imports its energy, its raw materials and its goods and depends on third countries for its security to one that produces, manufactures, and develops goods and services made domestically, able to fuel its green and digital transition, as well as its resilience and its defence capabilities.
Thank you.”
